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Abstract 
 
The creation of a public pension reserve fund is one of the reform measures that many countries implemented in order to 
guarantee the long term viability of existing government-operated pension systems. However, this measure raises the issue of 
the need to ensure sound management of those pension funds. This article focuses on the experience of the Portuguese public 
pension reserve fund and on the role it should accomplish in helping to finance the rising cost of public pensions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The partial prefunding of the otherwise pay-as-you-go system by the establishment and further development of a public 
pension reserve fund, involves an analysis of governance mechanisms and investment controls as a means of evaluating 
the sound management of the fund (Yermo, 2008; Stewart and Yermo, 2010). Only a credible and large-funded 
component pension system may enhance growth, facilitating financial intermediation and long-term investment. If the 
fund results in an increase of government spending and deficits, or if the fund is allocated exclusively to public 
investment, then national saving does not increase and some of the potential private capital market development is lost. 
The danger is that building up reserves for paying off the pension debt in later years might make things worse. The 
proposal of investing part of the trust funds in private bonds and equities, rather than solely in federal debt was discussed 
by Diamond (1996). 
In Portugal, the government introduced partial public capitalisation in 1989, with the creation of the public pension 
reserve fund (FEFSS - Fundo de Estabilização Financeira da Segurança Social). Capitalisation comprises the 
investment, at compound interest rates, of the surplus of the benefit system, net of management and acquisition charges, 
in order to obtain, by a given date, the amount of capital necessary to guarantee the payment of pensions for two years.  
The move from an unfunded, to a more actuarial system, requires an analysis of the various aspects related to 
efficiency, distribution, and stability (Lindbeck and Persson, 2003), as well as risk and risk sharing issues, administrative 
costs, and profitability. Indeed, the investment policies of fund managers strongly influence the allocation and productivity 
of capital, with important effects on the economy and on adequate retirement income and replacement rates (World Bank, 
1994). However, publicly managed funds are often required to invest in government securities, which imposes a hidden 
tax on contributing employees. 
This paper examines the architecture of the government-operated pension system in Portugal. An appraisal of the 
public pension reserve fund is presented, bringing attention to the governance structure and investment policy 
performance. Finally, some concerns and conclusions are discussed. 
 
2. The Architecture of Government-Operated Pension System 
 
In 1984, a system of obligatory Social Security insurance was created, whereby the active working population was made 
responsible for the financing of pensions paid out under the Social Security Law.  
The debate about the long term financial viability of the existing government-operated pension system motivated 
the introduction of partial public capitalisation in 1989, with the creation of the public pension reserve fund. Since then, 
the surplus of the benefit system was supposed to be transferred to this fund for investment in financial markets.  
During the last two decades, several other pension reforms took place. Indeed, both the major concern about the 
burden for future generations and the increase in pension expenditure, explain the further important changes that took 
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place in 2000, 2002, and 2007. Even so, cuts are envisaged as a result of the 2008 crisis and the recent financial bailout 
of Portugal, which will certainly have regressive effects (Heise and Lierse). 
The Social Security Law of 2000 explicitly considers and reinforces partial capitalisation, stipulating that there must 
be a transfer into the reserve fund of an amount of between two and four percent of the employees’ contributions, up to 
the level whereby total pensions expenditure is ensured for a minimum period of two years, in addition to the transfer of 
any annual surplus from the benefit system. The objective of this measure was to ensure the financial viability 
(sustainability) of the Social Security system. Silva et al. (2004) analysed the accounts of the benefit sub-system, as well 
as its impact on the portfolio of the public pension reserve fund. They estimated that the trust fund would be exhausted by 
2026, after reaching a peak in 2012, if the features of the system remained the same. 
The Social Security Law of 2002 also considered a diversification and enlargement of the financing sources of the 
system and introduced parametric changes: namely that it reduced benefits by changing the benefit rules in an actuarial 
direction and gave a more prominent role to the complementary pension system. The old age pension benefit formula 
was changed in order to take into account life-time wages, although transition clauses have considerably delayed the full 
introduction of this change. The previous old pension formula (based on a flat accrual rate of 2%, full length of service (40 
years), and a reference wage based on the best 10 years’ monthly wages out of the final 15 years) allows a maximum 
gross replacement rate of 80%. In the new formula, annual accrual rates are set according to the level of wages declared 
(decreasing between 2.3% and 2%). This only applies to pensioners with more than 20 years of contributions. For all the 
other pensioners, a flat accrual rate of 2% is still applied (Decree-Law nº 35/2002, 19th February). For all contributors 
with a contributory career of at least 15 years as of January, 2002, and for all contributors retiring by 2017, the best 
pension out of three different benefit formulas is assured: the old benefit formula, the new formula, and a proportional 
one. For all those other members of the workforce with contributions registered before January 2002, the formula that 
grants a higher pension - the new formula or the proportional one – is applied. This reform was expected to improve 
compliance within the system, as well as act as an incentive for older employees to stay on longer in the workforce. 
The recently approved Social Security Law of 2007 introduces a sustainability factor in the benefit calculation 
formula which is related to the evolution of average life expectancy, in order to ensure financial sustainability of the 
system in the face of adverse demographic and economic changes. On the other hand, it also establishes that the 
complementary system includes a public regime of capitalisation and complementary individual and collective systems. 
Indeed, in February 2008, retirement certificates (Certificados de Reforma) were established as the public regime of 
capitalisation. They are voluntary and for individual adhesion. In December 2011, the reference value was 1.08710 € and 
the fund value (the FCR - Fundo de Certificados de Reforma - is managed by the same State entity that manages the 
public pension reserve fund) was 19,990,439.64 €. The contribution rate is between 2% and 4% of the employee’s salary. 
At the end of 2009, there were 7,425 adherents. On the other hand, the complementary individual and collective systems 
include professional and individual private pension plans. The characterisation of these regimes is presented in Garcia 
(2004, 2006). 
In this changing environment, Garcia and Lopes (2009) emphasize that the parametric reforms to the existing 
PAYG, combined with the reserve fund, ensure its financial sustainability. On the other hand, the impact of a systemic 
reform, such as the adoption of a fully pre-funded system, on a range of macroeconomic variables, is very negative. 
Thus, this is not a viable option for policymakers when redesigning a Social Security pension system. Orenstein (2013) 
analyses the process known as “pension privatisation”, from 1981 to 2004. 
In addition to these major reforms, some other adjustment took place within the public sector pension system, with 
the objective of eliminating their differing approaches. Hence, real convergence was established, firstly in 1993 (Decree-
Law 286/93, 20th August) with the approval of a new pension formula calculation for new public employees since the 1st of 
September, 1993, which is identical to the one adopted by the benefit system of the Social Security system, and recently, 
in 2005 (Law 60/2005, 29th December). With the latter, eligibility requirements as well as pension formula calculation, are 
progressively identical to those of the private sector. 
Thus, at present, the eligibility requirements for old age pensions are the following: the minimum age for old age 
pensions for both men and women is 65 (since 1999: Decree-Law 9/99, 8th January), with an exception for the public 
sector, where the minimum age is 60, or after 36 years of service, whichever is reached first (this requirement has 
changed since 2003, meaning that since then both 60 years of age and 36 years of service must be fulfilled together), up 
until 2005. The minimum number of contributory years is 15 (since 1993: Decree-Law 329/93, 25th September) and 5 for 
the public sector, up until 2005. Finally, eligibility for early-retirement pensions starts at 55 years of age, as well as 30 
years of contributions, with a annual penalty of 4.5% between January 1999 (Decree-Law 9/99) and May 2007 (Decree-
Law 187 ), and of 6% since May 2007 up to the present. For the public sector, the indexation scheme is related to public 
employees’ wages up until 2005. Conversely, the indexation scheme is ad hoc for the private sector. For the private 
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sector scheme, the pension formula is calculated by:  , where P is the pension benefit, x is the legal 
replacement rate, N is the number of years of contributions, D is the maximum number of years of contributions taken into 
account,  is the reference salary, where index is the indexation rule for past earnings taken into 
consideration the pension calculation, and , is the sustainability factor, where  is life expectancy at the 
age of 65 in 2006, and is life expectancy at the age of 65 in the year prior to that for which pension benefit is 
calculated. Before 2002, the base period for the calculation of the reference salary (T) was the highest 10 years’ salaries 
over the final 15 years (after the reform of 2002, this will become average lifetime salaries by 2035), with x = 80% and D 
= 40 years. For civil servants, the base is the final salary for those who started working prior to September 1993, with x = 
100% (since 2004, x = 90%) and D = 36 years, after that date they are subject to the same rules as those of the private 
sector scheme. There is no ceiling and the indexation rule for past earnings is the price index. 
Finally, the statutory contribution rate is 34.75% for the private sector scheme (11% being the employee’s 
contribution, and 23.75% is contributed by the employer). Of this rate, approximately two thirds goes towards the 
payment of pensions of all types. Public employees paid a contribution rate of 10% up until 2011. Since 2011, their 
contribution rate has increased to 11%. 
Summing up, the pension system in Portugal includes three pillars. With regards to first pillar pensions, Portugal 
offers a universal State pension regime, which is means-tested, and labour-market-based public pension schemes. All of 
them are mandatory for employees of the private sector and the public sector, as well as the self-employed. They are 
pay-as-you-go schemes and State budget financing is applied in the case of the already closed public sector pension 
scheme (since 2005). The convergence between them is notable. The second pillar is not mandatory, except for some 
workers of the private sector (namely the banking and insurance sectors). The third pillar pension schemes are not 
mandatory.  
The following section describes the Portuguese reserve fund and considers its governance structure, restrictions 
and mandates, as well as the portfolios observed. 
 
3. The Public Pension Reserve Fund 
 
Many countries choose to prefund their pension obligations. Partially funded defined benefit schemes is the most 
common form of publicly mandated pension schemes with some degree of prefunding (Iglesias and Palacios, 2000). 
The accumulation of significant reserves by a large number of public pension schemes around the world will 
probably reduce the risk of future governments not being able to meet pension obligations. Therefore, the management of 
these funds has a direct effect on financial sustainability and potential benefit levels. In addition, it also has important 
indirect effects on the overall economy, especially when the funds are large in relation to domestic capital markets.  
The discussion about how these funds are governed and invested is very important, as is that about how their 
returns compare to relevant benchmarks.  
Iglesias and Palacios (2000) find that public pension funds are subject to a series of restrictions and mandates that 
produce poor returns. Often the non-pension objectives of the government lead to social and targeted investments and 
forced loans to the government to finance its deficit. Poor governance is the major cause of bad returns. 
Indeed, in the past, most public pension funds have not been invested effectively, largely because of political 
interference. Palacios (2002) reviews strategies for limiting risks that arise when a public entity is entrusted with 
managing national pension savings. In particular, an attempt is made to draw lessons from recent reforms in five OECD 
countries (Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden).  
A large body of the literature asserts the importance of governance on the performance of public pension funds. 
For example, Impavido (2002) surveys the empirical literature on the relationship between governance of public pension 
fund management and investment performance. Furthermore, it attempts to identify good governance practices and 
guidelines aimed at reducing political risk usually associated with public pension fund management. Results indicate that 
governance (ability to isolate fund management from political intervention) determines key investment strategies which, in 
turn, affect performance. Moreover, several statements are cited which guarantee good performance: 
• The sole objective of public pension funds should be to provide affordable and sustainable retirement income; 
• Governors should be independent from political power and fit and proper for their role; 
• The law of fiduciary duty should define the responsibilities of governors; 
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•  Governors should be made accountable for the performance of the fund; 
• Independent performance evaluations (investment, audit, actuarial, and other) should be conducted by 
external and independent entities on a regular basis; 
• Outside experts should be used regularly during the definition and implementation of fund policies; and 
• Internal controls should be established to avoid conflicts of interest. 
Vittas et al. (2008) present the experience of four new public pension funds that were created in Norway, Canada, 
Ireland, and New Zealand. These countries promoted a modern framework for efficient investment performance by 
emphasizing strong fund governance structures and public accountability and transparency. Also, Yermo (2008) analyses 
the main Social Security reserve funds: SSRFs and sovereign pension reserve funds, plus SPRFs in OECD countries, 
focusing on the reserve funds of the following countries: Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway 
and Sweden. More recently, Stewart and Yermo (2010) emphasize the essential importance of ensuring good 
governance of reserve funds in order to meet their goal of financing public pension systems. In addition, they suggest 
avenues for strengthening the governance and management of the Japanese Government Pension Investment Fund 
(GPIF), the largest single pool of pension assets in the world. 
The Portuguese public pension reserve fund (the so-called Social Security Financial Stabilisation Fund), as 
previously mentioned, was established in 1989 and, by December 2011, it had 8,872.45 million Euros in assets, which is 
equivalent to 5.1% of GDP (the FEFSS is ranked among the largest European pension funds). The public pension 
reserve fund is managed by a State institution, the IGFCSS (Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização da 
Segurança Social), which was set up in 1999. The sources of financing are both benefit system surpluses and a 
percentage of between 2% and 4% of obligatory contributions paid by employees to the Social Security system, until the 
level of assets of the fund attains the equivalent value of two years of Social Security benefits. An analysis is made below 
of its role and composition (the channeling of these surpluses into the reserve fund is not always straightforward), as well 
as the crucial aspects of governance and investment.  
The IGFCSS is established as an entity within the public administration, which is specialised in asset management 
with medium and long term investment objectives. The first annual report dates from 2001. Annual reports from after 
2009 are not available (more recent data is available from the Report of Social Security Accounts, 2010-2011, IGFSS). 
A large amount of legislation has been passed regarding both the public pension reserve fund and the 
corresponding management entity, which contributes to a lack of transparency (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Legislation, 1989-2012 
 
Year 1989 1999 2000 2002 2004 2007 2007 2008 2008 2010 2011 2011 2012 
Measures 
 
Creation 
of 
FEFSS 
Creation of 
IGFCSS 
Establishes 
the 
IGFCSS 
statutes, 
namely 3 
governing 
bodies 
Statutes 
of FEFSS
Changes 
to the 
statutes of 
FEFSS: 
the 
creation 
of the 
strategic 
reserve 
Changes to 
the statutes 
of FEFSS: 
more 
detailed 
asset 
composition, 
increasing 
the 
maximum 
investment 
in equities to 
25% 
Changes 
to 
IGFCSS 
statutes
Changes to 
IGFCSS 
statutes: 
establishes 3 
departments 
(Investments; 
Studies, 
Planning and 
Control; 
Management 
Support) 
 
Creation 
of FCR
Statutes 
of FCR
Changes 
to 
IGFCSS 
statutes 
Changes 
to 
IGFCSS 
statutes 
New Law 
of the 
New 
Ministry of 
Solidarity 
and 
Social 
Security 
Changes 
to 
IGFCSS 
statutes 
Legislation DL 
259/89, 
14 
August 
DL 449-
A/99, 4th 
November
Portaria 
375/2000, 
26th June
Portaria 
1557-
B/2002, 
30th 
December
Portaria 
1273/2004, 
7th October
DL 
216/2007, 
29th May
Portaria 
640/2007, 30 
May 
DL 
26/2008, 
22nd 
February
Portaria 
212 
/2008, 
29 
February
Portaria 
1329-
D/2010, 
30 
December
DL 
39/2011, 
21st 
March 
DL 
126/2011, 
29th 
December 
DL 
203/2012, 
28 
August 
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Table 2. Mandates of the Board of Directors and Annual Reports, 2001-2009 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
President of the 
Board of Directors 
Joel Hasse 
Ferreira 
Pedro Alves 
Guerra 
Pedro Alves 
Guerra 
Pedro 
Alves 
Guerra
Manuel Pedro 
Baganha 
Manuel Pedro 
Baganha 
Manuel Pedro 
Baganha 
Manuel Pedro 
Baganha 
Manuel 
Pedro 
Baganha 
Annual Reports PT PT PT PT PT PT PT PT PT 
Statutory Audit 
Certification 
 
Figueiredo, 
Neves & 
Associado 
 
Figueiredo, 
Neves & 
Associado 
 
Figueiredo, 
Neves & 
Associado 
KPMG KPMG Delloitte Delloitte Delloitte Delloitte 
Facts & Figures  ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG ENG 
Awards     “Committed to 
Excellence in 
Europe” 
“Best Pension Fund 
2006 in Portugal” 
by IPE – 
Investments & 
Pensions Europe 
Management 
System 
Certification by 
APCER and 
IONet 
Management 
System 
Certification by 
APCER and 
IONet 
 
 
The principal mission of IGFCSS is the management, through capitalisation, of the public pension reserve fund portfolio 
(FEFSS). Additionally, the Social Security Law of 2002 allows for the IGFCSS to not only carry out the portfolio 
management of the FEFSS, but also to extend its activity to the management of complementary systems. This was 
explicitly considered even further in the new law of 2007 (as mentioned, in 2008, retirement certificates were established 
and their respective fund is the FCR). The organisation structure is composed of three boards: the Supervisory Council 
(with three members), the Advisory Board (with nine members) and the Board of Directors (with three members). The 
latter includes four departments, the Financial Investments Department, the IT Department, the Administrative and 
Accounts Department and the Control and Planning Department and is responsible for producing the Annual Report (see 
Table 2). The Board of Directors is responsible for formulating investment policy, setting strategic asset allocation and 
supervising management. 
The asset allocation regulation has experienced changes regarding maximum legal limits (see Table 3) and 
includes the following assets classes: 
• Government securities or others guaranteed by the Portuguese State; 
• Bonds and commercial certificates; 
• Shares, securities and other similar investments in listed companies; 
• Investment units in real estate and security funds; 
• Real estate; 
• Deposits and other short term applications of capital; 
• Interest receivable from deferrals and accruals. 
 
Table 3. Asset Allocation Legal Limits, 2000 and 2004 
 
Asset Classes 2000 2004 Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Debt guaranteed by the Portuguese State 50% 100% 50% 100% 
Other Debt not guaranteed by the Portuguese State, 
with ‘BBB-/Baa3’ rating or higher (investment grade) 0% 50% 0% 40% 
Equities traded in OECD regulated markets 0% 20% 0% 25% 
Mixed Mutual Fund Shares 0% 20% 0% 10% 
Real Estate 0% 30% 0% 10% 
Strategic Reserve - - 5% 
Exposure to currency risk - - 0% 15% 
Diversification – Securities issued by the 
same entity or operations performed with 
the same counterpart 
Fund 0% 10% 0% 5% 
Equity 0% 20% 0% 20% 
Use of derivatives Only for hedging purposes or for the efficient management of the portfolio, specifically for non-leveraged replication of the returns on the underlying assets 
 
The investment policy followed by the management board of IGFCSS must guarantee capital preservation, for which it 
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must obtain a growth rate at least equal to the expected inflation rate for the Euro zone. The public pension reserve fund 
is considered an instrument of public capitalisation.  
In addition, the IGFSS assumes the role of an entity which is responsible for the efficient management of public 
pension reserves, with the objective of supplying a competitive asset management service that ensures a public 
alternative of capitalisation. The IGFCSS must respect the following investments restrictions: 
• All assets must be denominated in Euros; 
• At least 50% of the total assets must be invested in debt which is guaranteed by the Portuguese State; 
• Equity investment must not exceed 25% of total assets; 
• All of the bonds held in the portfolio must have a minimum rating of BBB/Baa2 (however, the Board of 
Directors has decided to restrict its investments to assets with a rating of not lower than A/A3); 
• Investment in mutual fund units must not exceed 10% of total assets. 
Table 4 shows the evolution of the value of the reserve pension fund portfolio. By 2009 this value reached a peak 
of accumulated assets of 9,407.66 million Euros, which corresponded to 97.8% of annual pension benefits expenditure 
(or 11.74 months, still below the objective of two years of Social Security benefits). This represented 5.8% of GDP.  
 
Table 4. Value of the Fund Portfolio 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total value (million Euros) 3,798.64 4,699.42 5,428.31 5,779.05 6,176.17 6,640.09 7,560.24 8,338.88 9,407.66 9,637.95 8,872.45 
% of annual total pension 
payments 2/3% 
77% 
9.2 
months 
72.5% 
8.7 
months 
79.9% 
9.6 
months 
80.1% 
9.6 
months 
80.7% 
9.7 
months 
86.2% 
10.3 
months 
95.1% 
11.41 
months 
97.8% 
11.74 
months 
93.1% 
11,16 
months 
85.71% 
10,29 
months 
% of GDP 3.1% 3.7% 4.2% 4.0% 4..1% 4.3% 4.6% 5% 5.8% 5.6% 5.1% 
Source: Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização da Segurança Social, Annual Reports (2001-2009); Conta da 
Segurança Social, 2010-2011. 
 
However, the transfer of benefit system surpluses to the public pension reserve funds has not been made on a regular 
basis (Figure 1), which might be a cause for concern. 
 
 
An analysis of the adopted governance model is due, given that ensuring the good governance of reserve funds is 
essential to meeting their goal of financing public pension systems. As mentioned earlier, the IGFCSS is the management 
entity of the public pension reserve fund. The governing body has grown over the years and has increased by 10 
members. Table 5 presents the evolution of its organisation structure. 
 
Table 5. Organisation Structure 
Function 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Senior Managers 2 2 2 2 na na na na 2 3 
Managers 1 4 5 4 na na na na 3 3 
Qualified Technical Personnel 6 8 11 11 na na na na na  
21 Semi-Qualified Technical 1 0 0 0 na na na na na 
Administrative 6 7 6 6 na na na na na na 
Auxiliary 2 1 1 1 na na na na 4 1 
Total 18 22 25 24 24 25 26 24 27/29 28 
Source: Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização da Segurança Social, Annual Reports (2001-2009). na – not 
available 
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Table 6 shows asset allocation through the period of 1998-2011. Major shifts in investment strategy occurred with the 
decision to create the strategic reserve in 2002 and the expansion of allocations to private equity in 2004 (see Table3). 
 
Table 6. Composition of the Fund Portfolio (%), 1998-2011 
 
Assets 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Public Debt Securities 73.16 73.34 56.49 51.01 51.45 52.32 53.66 50.51 50.29 50.45 55.90 50.56 53,17 50.67 
Other Bonds 7.72 14.66 23.68 29.77 30.13 22.53 20.60 17.65 19.82 19.62 21.47 27.33 18.41 11.88 
Trust Units 1.38 3.80 3.95 6.68 1.64 0.17 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Shares 0.16 1.30 4.69 7.12 5.15 9.23 13.51 24.24 20.83 20.67 16.61 17.13 23,24 16.31 
Real Estate 0.32 0.52 0.89 0.71 1.56 1.43 1.78 2.99 3.58 3.20 2.95 2.31 2,20 2.31 
Deposit A/Cs 17.27 6.38 10.30 4.49 7.20 11.20 7.12 1.62 2.19 2.91 1.07 0.39 0,80 17.34 
Strategic Reserve - - - - 2.87 3.10 3.19 2.98 3.30 3.16 1.99 2.27 2,17% 1.46 
Total (millions €) 1,647.50 2,294.87 3,075.13 3,798.64 4,699.42 5,428.31 5,779.05 6,176.17 6,640.09 7,560.24 8,338.88 9,407.66 9,637.95 8,872.45 
 
Source: Instituto de Gestão de Fundos de Capitalização da Segurança Social, Annual Reports (1998-2009); Conta da 
Segurança Social, 2011. 
 
Portuguese State bonds constitute the largest proportion of investments, reflecting the legal obligation that not less than 
50% of assets must be invested in such assets. The share made up of “Other Bonds” includes debt assets of other 
member states of the EMU and of private companies. In 2011, equities accounted for 16.31% of the portfolio, although 
the legal maximum is set at 25%. 
The new strategic reserve, which has been in operation since 2002, cannot represent more than 5% of total 
assets. By 2011, it represented 2.17% of the portfolio. 
Management costs have been decreasing, contrasting with the increasing size of the organisation structure (Table 
7) and salaries. Net income registered a prominent negative value in 2008. 
  
Table 7. Management Costs and Profitability 
 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Net Income 
(million Euros) 118 109 106 313 321 393 316 286 -313 552 na na 
Management Costs (%) 0.044 0.0457 0.04871 0.0410 0.0404 0.03789 0.03248 0.03% 0.029 0.028 na na 
Transaction, Deposit & 
Commission Costs & 
Brokerage Fees (%) 
0.044 0.0311 0.02473 0.0264 0.0385 0.03101 0.02182 0.027 0.03 0.034 na na 
Total Costs (%) 
(Costs/Amount under 
management) 
0.088 0.0768 0.0734 0.0674 0.0789 0.0689 0.0543 0.057 0.059 0.062 0.054 0.049 
Salaries 
(thousand Euros) 947 858 1036 1208 1174 1183 1041 998 1003 1150 na na 
na – not available 
 
Source: IGFCSS, Annual Reports 2000-2009; Conta da Segurança Social, 2010-2011. 
 
Administrative costs are relatively low compared with other public pension reserve funds (OECD, 2009, 2011). 
In 2006 and 2009, the management model of FEFSS won the Investments & Pension Europe Award for the best 
pension fund in Portugal (see Table 3). 
In 2009, a new strategic management policy was established which includes risk management indexation to 
EFFAS Portugal and the transition to a dynamical benchmark. However, since 2011 this has been abandoned, owing to 
the adverse financial conditions caused by the sovereign debt crisis that affected Portugal. The outbreak of the Greek 
financial crisis in 2009-2010 and the resulting transmission of difficulties in external financing to other countries, including 
Portugal, Ireland, and Spain, are among a number of events that led to large market movements (Araújo and Garcia, 
2013).  
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4. Investment Returns 
 
Regarding investment performance, real rate of return has shown a growth trend from 2002 to 2006. However, the 
average rate of return since the Fund’s inception has been decreasing, reaching its lowest level in 2011 (see Table 8). 
Therefore, some lessons need to be learnt. One possible explanation may be the growing weight of equities in portfolio 
composition and the stock crash that was registered during 2000-2002 and since 2008. In addition, the Board of Directors 
should establish clear performance benchmarks in order to assess investment performance, since there is no clear 
measurable objective regarding rate of return. Annual benchmarking should be clearly established and the objective 
should be to seek to maximize long-term investments returns, whilst maintaining a prudent level of risk.  
 
 Table 8. Public Pension Reserve Fund Rates of Return 
 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nominal Rate of Return (%)(Net of Tax & Costs) 4.11 3.28 2.51 6.50 5.90 6.76 5.18 4.08 -3.86 6.25 0.08 -11.00 
Real Rate of Return (%) (Net of Tax & Costs) 1.97 0.96 0.21 4.45 3.46 4.44 3.20 0.98 -6.46 5.28 -2.08 -13.3 
Average real rate of return since inception 4.36 3.41 2.44 2.80 2.91 3.12 3.09 2.87 1.71 2.05 1.57 -0.13 
Excess return to the cost of public debt na na na na n.a. 0.05 0.72 na na na na na 
na – not available 
 
Source: IGFCSS, Annual Reports, 2000-2008; Conta da Segurança Social, 2009-2011. 
 
It is noticeable that the change of the Board of Directors is always accompanied by changing the Statutory Audit Entity 
(see Table 2). In addition, the Board of Directors that was appointed in 2005, is still in office (for nine years now), which 
gives rise to the question as to what is the limit for renewing mandates of the Board of Directors. Therefore there is a 
need to clearly stipulate the process for terminating a directorship in an act of law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this study was to present the public pension system in its entirety and to analyse the functioning of public 
pension fund management. The creation of public pension funds in several countries gives rise to concern about the 
ability to ensure their independence and their insulation from political pressures. Hence, special emphasis should be 
placed on upgrading their investment policy guidelines and on strengthening their governance structure. Public pension 
funds have the potential to benefit from low operating costs, as they benefit from economies of scale and do not incur 
large marketing costs. However, this important advantage has been squandered by poor investment performance in most 
countries, on account of weak governance structures, the lack of independence from government interference, and a low 
level of transparency and public accountability. Therefore there is a need to promote a modern set of guidelines for 
efficient investment performance. 
In conclusion, given the public reserve fund returns, a mixed system of capitalisation offers good perspectives for 
guaranteeing the financial sustainability of the Social Security system. In general, the Portuguese public pension reserve 
fund shows a good level of governance and has been a positive experience, but some weaknesses have been identified 
which highlight the need for reform. The annual reports lack transparency to a degree and make comparison difficult, 
which may be related to the duration of the mandate of the governing body. Pension policy reform is often challenging as 
it involves long-term decisions in the face of numerous short-term political pressures (Bonoli, 2003). Such reforms will 
ultimately improve the long-term investment performance of the funds and the solvency of the Social Security systems. 
Further research needs to be carried out on this subject. 
 
6. Acknowledgement 
 
UECE (Research Unit on Complexity and Economics) is financially supported by FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a 
Tecnologia), Portugal. This article is part of the Strategic Project (Pest-OE/EGE/UI0436/2014). 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 23 
November  2014 
          
 341 
References 
 
Araújo, A. and Garcia, M. T. M. (2013) Risk contagion in the north-western and southern European stock markets. Journal of Economics 
and Business, 69, 1-34.  
Bonoli, G. (2003) Two Worlds of Pension Reform in Western Europe. Comparative Politics, 35, 4: 399-416. 
Diamond, Peter A. (1996) Proposals to Restructure Social Security. Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 10, Number 3—
Summer 1996, Pages 67–88 
Garcia, M. T. M. (2004) An Analysis of Pension Funds in Portugal. Pensions – An International Journal, Volume 9, Number 3, April, pp. 
227-245.  
Garcia, M. T. M. (2006) Individual Responsibility for the Adequacy of Retirement Income. Pensions – An International Journal, Vol. 11, 
No. 3, May, 192-199.  
Garcia, M. T. M. and Lopes, E. G. (2009) Macro economic impact of reforming a PAYG system: the Portuguese case. International 
Social Security Review, Vol. 62, No1., 1-23.  
Heise, Arne and Lierse, Hanna (2011) The Effects of European Austerity Programmes on Social Security Systems. Modern Economy, 
2011, 2, 498-513.  
Hess, David and Impavido, Gregorio (2004) Governance of Public Pension Funds: Lessons from Corporate Governance and 
International Evidence. Chapter 2. 
Iglesias, A. and Palacios, R. J. (2000) Managing Public Pension Reserves. Part I: Evidence from the International Experience. SP 
Discussion Paper No. 0003, January. 
Impavido, G. (2002) On the Governance of Public Pension Fund Management, The World Bank, 20th August.  
Lindbeck, A. and Persson, M. (2003) The Gains from Pension Reform. Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XLI, March, pp. 74-112. 
OECD (2009) Pensions at a glance 2009: retirement-income systems in OECD countries – ISBN 978-92-64-06071-5 – © OECD 2009. 
Orenstein, Mitchell A. (2013) Pension Privatization: Evolution of a Paradigm. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, 
Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 26, No. 2, April, pp. 259–281. 
Palacios, Robert. (2002) Managing Public Pension Reserves Part II: Lessons from Five Recent OECD Initiatives. Social Protection 
Discussion Paper Series, No. 0219. 
Silva, C. M. P., Calado, J. P. T., and Garcia, M. T. M. (2004) The Financial Sustainability of the Portuguese Social Security System. The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, Vol. 29, No. 3, July, pp. 417-439.  
Stewart, F. and J. Yermo (2010) Options to Improve the Governance and Investment of Japan's Government Pension Investment Fund. 
OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance and Private Pensions, No. 6, OECD. 
Vittas, D., Impavido, G., and O´Connor, R. (2008) Upgrading the Investment Policy Framework of Public Pension Funds. Policy 
Research Working Paper 4499. The World Bank. 
Yermo, Juan. (2007) Reforming the Valuation and Funding of Pension Promises. OECD Working Paper on Insurance and Private 
Pensions No. 13. 
Yermo, Juan. (2008) Governance and Investment of Public Pension Reserve Funds in Selected OECD Countries. OECD Working Paper 
on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 15. 
World Bank Policy Research Report (1994) Averting the Old Age Crisis, Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth, Oxford 
University Press. 
